A competitive approach to saving universal health care The original role model for modern European health care systems the German Gesetzliche Krankenversicherung (GKV) (solidarity-financed, selfgoverning sickness funds for workers and employees)seems to be stuck in the mud. Rising medical costs and overspending are threatening to exceed global budgets, while the government and employers want to cap insurance contributions in order to lower costs and keep German labour competitive. Yet a more competitive system of health care could not only increase individual choice, but also help to rein in runaway costs while preserving comprehensive coverage.
The current system of universal health care coverage has its origins in the welfare system introduced by Bismarck in the l880s and covers around 90% of the population. Financing occurs through contributions based on a percentage of the individual's working income on a pay-as-you-go basis; i.e. today's contributions pay for today's health care. Even though the system has survived and grown since then, in times of economic difficulty like these, its flaws become apparent: individuals are reduced to being the recipients of entitlements bestowed upon them; and state regulation makes the system highly inefficient and threatens its viability. This gives rise to a vicious circle: rising contributions increase individual demand for health care since people wish to obtain something for their higher premiums, but individual restraint in the demand for health care has no impact on personal insurance premiums. Thus there is a gap between individual and collective rationality. As a result, total health care costs increase even more and the circle starts again.
As a first step, the welfare recipient has to be transformed into a sovereign customer by increasing his/her responsibilities, because only the individual can define his/her own preferences. This can be achieved through a combination of several measures. The insured individual needs to have more control over the different aspects of treatment. This requires full information on treatment costs as well as on possible alternatives. He/she also needs to be given a choice between various payment models in order to be able to achieve potential savings, thereby generating incentives to act cost-effectively. New payment models should include reduced premiums coupled with co-payments, or the right to change between sickness funds without notice when the premiums increase.
At the same time, more freedom is needed for the self-regulatory bodies (e.g. sickness funds and associations of physicians) to devise new schemes of care, such as disease management, and put them to the test.
The sickness funds must be allowed to offer varying amounts of coverage in excess of a medically defined minimum. The same goes for selective contracts with suppliers of health services under managed care arrangements. These contracts should encompass every aspect of health care from ambulatory and inpatient care, to cure and rehabilitation, as well as the supply of drugs and other remedies.
In order for these new forms of finance and of competition to succeed, it is essential to avoid any unnecessary interference on the part of the government. Such actions would only distort the results, which would then be blamed on competition itself. This is currently happening since the government has set time limits on the trials of new models of care and has also regulated their content. In addition, government insists on the prior consent of the Kassenarztliche Vereinigung (Association of Physicians), who are approved to provide services for all health plans funded by social insurance. This biases any innovation in favour of already wellestablished programmes and gives the physician associations undue influence in bargaining with the sickness funds, instead of encouraging new competitors with enough freedom to take on existing monopolies.
Another example of political interference was the decrease in the rate of employee contributions by 0.4% in January 1997. An increase in contributions is only permissible if coupled with a 1 DM or 1% increase in co-payments for each 0.1 % increase in contributions, and then only if a reduction of statutory benefits has already taken place. Such a coupling of a rise in contributions, co-payments and benefits makes no sense in economic terms. In a free market economy, it cannot be the government's task to determine the rates charged by individual sickness funds. The health sector is an expanding market and must be able to grow unhindered in order to provide needed services and, in due course, to create jobs and increase welfare as a whole.
The size of the contributory share paid by the employer is also a concern. It should be disengaged from any rate hikes or changes in benefits covered. In a truly free and, therefore, competitive market, it must be the prerogative of the funds to be able to woo customers with extended benefits, paid for by the customers themselves. Thus it is a sign of consumer sovereignty that individuals can choose freely between different levels of coverage without the employer'S share being affected. Only then will personal preferences have no negative effects on the market for labour and on the competitiveness of Germany as a whole.
Thus for a solidarity-based health care system to func-J Health Serv Res Policy Volume 3 Number 1 January 1998 1 tion against a background of abundant medical possibilities and ever-increasing demand, several things have to be taken into account simultaneously. All attempts at detailed administrative influence on the part of government are doomed to fail because of the enormous complexity of the system. Only reforms that aim to create more competition will, in the long run, ensure adequate, effective and efficient medical care that is also of reasonable cost, of high quality and in accordance with ethical principles. To achieve this, it is imperative that legislators -instead of constantly interfering with the health care system -concentrate on matters of order, provide everyone involved with more freedom of choice through a legal framework that is ethically, socially and economically adequate and give direct financial support to those on low incomes to enable them to participate in the system.
Shifting finance out of acute hospitals
An expanding market needs freedom of competition to keep growing, and, no matter what system is to operate within this market, there needs to be freedom of action for all participants so that they produce the best results possible. In summary, political interference in the market for health care must be reduced to setting the broad framework. Adverse effects on economic growth and employment must be avoided and the preferences of the insured must be built into the system to the fullest extent possible.
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Shifting finance out of acute hospitals
Since the late 1970s there have been policy statements that the growth in acute hospital services should be restricted to allow development of the non-acute sector. For example, in the UK National Health Service (NHS) it was forecast in 1992 that between 2000 and 7000 beds could become surplus to requirements in London.' The driving force was the continuing increase in the efficiency with which hospital beds were used. The resources diverted from the acute hospital sector would be used to raise the standards of comparatively underdeveloped primary and care. The reality has been somewhat different. Health care purchasers have had difficulty extracting resources from the acute sector. This is not solely the fault of providers. To develop substitute services in the community imposes double running-costs, at least initially.f It takes time to release both the fixed and the semi-fixed costs associated with large institutions. The system of NHS capital charging, introduced in 1991, although defensible on economic grounds, has resulted in even modest shifts in service being more expensive to achieve than hitherto. Furthermore, shifting resources has been accompanied by sharp rises in hospital activity, which have tended to utilise any potentially released capacity. A political reluctance to close beds has served to perpetuate the emphasis on hospital activity and advances in acute sector medical technology.
Faced with these realities, it is not surprising that NHS purchasers have experienced difficulty in reconfiguring services. There is little new money, so major shifts in thinking and service provision are needed. There is also provider resistance to change. Providers suspect destabilisation: any threat to income is perceived as a serious financial risk given the magnitude of their fixed and semi-fixed costs. In discussions with purchasers, the incentive for providers is to under-estimate the variable cost of threatened services, leaving the impression that it is hardly worth withdrawing given the minimal savings. Such negotiations -the inevitable outcome of a system based on competition not cooperation -are real and conflict with attempts by purchasers to relocate services.
What can be learnt from this situation? Firstly, the system in the NHS of annual contracting causes unnecessary hostility which conflicts with purchasers and providers trying to achieve the same goal: to obtain the best care for patients within available resources. Longer term agreements might provide greater stability and a welcome increase in security (but not at the expense of efficiency) for providers. Secondly, it highlights the lack of information to inform important decisions. Disputes at the pre-contract stage about prices, and disputes about purchasers' declared intentions to disinvest from a service, are hampered by the paucity of accurate and timely information. It remains difficult to obtain genuinely comparable prices from providers which take into account factors such as case mix.
Part of the difficulty stems from the way comparative price (and implicitly cost, since providers' prices are meant to equal average total cost) information is used. Providers are inevitably suspicious that regulators, in the absence of reliable information about service quality, will use price information as evidence of (in)efficiency. They will expect purchasers to switch contracts between providers if prices appear uncompetitive. There is some disincentive, therefore, for providers to supply
